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MARITIME PIRACY:




Maritime piracy disrupts international navigation and trade and threatens the
lives and property of people of many nations. Thus, because of both the human
and commercial cost and the threat to regional security at sea, piracy has become a
matter of grave concern for the international community and has consequently
attracted global attention. Several international organizations including the United
Nations Security Council and General Assembly, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and
regional organizations such as the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU)
have been actively engaged in addressing this grave problem.
Navies from the EU and NATO and from several countries, including the
United States, Russia, China, India, and Japan, have deployed their warships off
the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to protect trade routes and the global
supply chain because of the recent upsurge of attacks on ships by Somali pirates.
However, notwithstanding these deployments, the attacks on and hijacking of ships
transiting the area continue, and as the problem is not confined just to that
geographical area, pirate attacks have intensified in other areas where there is not
such deployment, including West Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean.
Thus, it would be a fair appraisal that these efforts have met with only limited
success in combating the menace of piracy and armed robbery.
To address the challenge posed by pirates, the United Nations Security
Council has adopted several resolutions authorizing states to take the necessary
action to combat piracy, including in the territorial waters of Somalia. Norms
prescribed under several conventions including the U.N. Law of the Sea
Convention (UNCLOS), maritime law, and domestic laws of various states provide
for jurisdiction by states to prosecute and punish pirates. The UN Secretary
General has offered several options on "prosecuting and imprisoning persons
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responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,"
including the creation of a regional or international tribunal.1 Although piracy
must indeed be seen as a global challenge that requires a global response, 2 and
while this paper addresses the challenges of piracy to the entire international
community and explores actions that could effectively meet them, its focus will
primarily be on the Somali pirates.
The next section assesses the nature and scope of the challenge. This is
followed by a discussion of the legal framework applicable to piracy and a review
of the wide range of international, regional, and national responses to prevent and
deter acts of piracy and punish the perpetrators. The concluding sections contain
an appraisal and recommendations.
II. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE CHALLENGE
Acts of piracy have been on the rise for several years, presenting a serious
threat to commercial maritime shipping, especially in the Gulf of Aden and off the
Horn of Africa. For international shipping and trade both east and west of the Suez
Canal, the strategic importance of the Gulf of Aden lies in the number of vessels
and the volume of the international trade passing through it-22,000 vessels
annually, carrying around eight percent of the world's trade, including twelve
percent of the total volume of oil transported by sea, raw materials and finished
goods, as well.
3
Somalia has suffered from the tragedy of an ongoing civil strife since 1991,
and this surge of piracy off its coast is primarily related to its being a failed state
4
1. U.N. Security Council [SCOR], Report of the Secretary-General on possible options to further
the aim ofprosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for acts ofpiracy and armed robbery at sea
off the coast of Somalia, including, in particular, options for creating special domestic chambers
possibly with international components, a regional tribunal or an international tribunal and
corresponding imprisonment arrangements, taking into account the work of the Contact Group on
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the existing practice in establishing international and mixed tribunals,
and the time and resources necessary to achieve and sustain substantive results, 80-104, U.N. Doc.
S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter SG's Report].
2. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSEN, BENJAMIN BROCKMAN-HAWE & PATRICIA GOFF., AM. SOC'Y
OF INT'L LAW ET AL., SUPPRESSING MARITIME PIRACY: EXPLORING THE OPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, at i (2009) ("Maritime piracy is a persistent global criminal activity, and solving the Somali
problem does not solve piracy in the rest of the world.").
3. Piracy in Waters Off the Coast of Somalia, INT'L MAR. ORG. [IMO] (Nov. 13, 2009),
http://www5.imo.org/SharePoint/mainframe.asp?topic id= 1178.
4. In November 2008 the U.N. commissioned a workshop on "Piracy Off the Somali Coast,"
which brought together experts from various fields - diplomacy, the military, peacekeeping, and
humanitarian aid, among others. Workshop Commissioned by the Special Representative of the
Secretary General of the UN to Somalia Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Nairobi, Kenya, Nov.
10-21, 2008, Piracy Off the Somali Coast, 2 (Nov. 21, 2008), available at http://www.imcsnet.
org/imcs/docs/somalia piracyintl experts report consolidated.pdf [hereafter U.N. Experts Report on
Somali Piracy]. The experts produced a comprehensive study of the political and legal issues involved.
Id. The report proved influential with the United Nations Security Council, as several of its
recommendations paralleled those made in Security Council Resolution 1851 of December 16, 2008.
See id. at 41-44. The report states that Somalia has been a failed state for about 20 years "divorced
from the world economy, regional and global institutions, and the rule of law." Id at 33.
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with endemic poverty and lawlessness. Acts of piracy have also disrupted the
delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia.5 Off Somalia's long coast line-almost
2000 miles-foreign vessels have engaged in unauthorized fishing and the
dumping of toxic material and waste ever since the early 1990s. 6 The names of
pirate fleets such as "National Volunteer Coast Guard of Somalia" and "Somali
Marines" can be aptly described as a "testament to pirates' initial motivation. 7
However, their current motivation lies in the huge ransom payments, in the range
of millions of dollars, pirates receive from the companies involved, including
vessel owners and insurers.8 Pirates use hijacked fishing vessels as mother ships as
they prey on their victims off Somalia's coastline, and have now extended their
reach to more than 700 miles offshore.9 They wage attacks with sophisticated
weapons such as M-16 and AK-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades
instead of machetes, knives, and guns, which were their weapons just a few years
ago; they are also equipped with speedboats, global positioning systems, and
satellite phones.10
The Piracy Reporting Center of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), a
division of the International Chamber of Commerce, issues periodic piracy reports.
It reports that incidents of piracy and armed robbery in 2009 exceeded 400,11
Africa accounting for 270 of these, and the Somalia coast and the Gulf of Aden
accounting for 196.12 Compare these more than 400 attacks with 239, 263, and
293 attacks that were reported in 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively.13
According to the annual report of the Piracy Reporting Center for 2009, there
were 84 attempted attacks, 153 vessels boarded, 120 vessels fired upon and 49
hijacked, compared to 46 ships fired upon in 2008.14 The report states that in 2009
a total of 1052 crew were taken hostage, while 68 were injured and eight were
5. Id. at 29.
6. Ishaan Tharoor, How Somalia's Fishermen Became Pirates, TIME, Apr. 18, 2009, available at
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1892376,00.html.
7. Id
8. Pirates extorted $60 million in ransom in 2009 alone. See President Ali Treki, Address at the
Informal Meeting of the General Assembly on International Maritime Piracy (May 14, 2010),
http://www.un.org/ga/president/64/statements/piracyl4O5lO.shtml.
9. See INT'L MAR. BUREAU, INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY
AGAINST SHIPS: ANNUAL REPORT: JANUARY 1 - DECEMBER 31,2009 39 (2010).
10. William Pentland, Sea Piracy's Bloody Growth, FORBES.COM (June 10, 2008, 6:00 AM),
www.forbes.com/2008/06/09/piracy-logistics-shipping-biz-logistics-cx wp_0610piracy.html.
11. INT'L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 9, at 5-6. Although the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
defines piracy in limiting terms, the IMB has adopted a broader approach for statistical purposes as it
combines the terms "piracy" and "armed robbery at sea." Id. at 3. The International Maritime
Organization also issues periodic reports on acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. For the
2009 report, see Int'l Mar. Org. [IMO], Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:
Annual Report 2009, IMO Doc. MSC.4/Circ.152 (Mar. 29, 2010), available at http://www.imo.org/
OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/MIonthy%20 ando2annuao2piarcy%2and%20armed%2
Orobbery%20report/152-Annual2009.pdf
12. INT'L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 9, at 5-6.
13. Id.
14. Id at 12.
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killed in various incidents.15  However, increased naval patrols (NATO's
Operation Open Shield and Allied Protector; the EU-NAVFOR Mission; the
International Combined Task Force-151; and several nations' forces) conducting
anti-piracy operations have reduced the success rate of these attacks since pirates
find it increasingly difficult to board and hijack vessels. 16 However, the first eight
months of 2010 witnessed 286 attacks, 17 demonstrating that, despite the naval
presence off the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden, 18 pirates remain active.
In his report of July 26, 2010, to the UN Security Council, the Secretary-
General noted that as of May 15, 2010, 450 mariners were being held hostage on
vessels captured by pirates off the coast of Somalia. 19 More than 45 states
participate in naval operations to combat piracy, conducted unilaterally or
coordinated by the European Union Naval Operation "Atalanta," the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the US-led Combined Taskforce 151 .2
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK APPLICABLE TO PIRACY
A. Introduction
The legal framework applicable to piracy consists of the customary
international law norm, under which piracy is a jus gentium crime and therefore
subject to universal jurisdiction,21 meaning that no nexus is required and thus
jurisdiction is available regardless of the nationality of the pirates or the victims,
the ship or aircraft, or the location of the act. However, it has been suggested that
"the nominal availability of universal jurisdiction for piracy does not translate in
practice into ending impunity for the crime," as states have not implemented the
jurisdictional grant through legislation.22
15. Id. at 12-13.
16. Id. at 38.
17. See IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Acts Reported During
August 2010, Annex 1-2, IMO Doc. MSC.4/Circ. 159 (Sept. 1, 2010); IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy
and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Acts Reported During July 2010, Annex 1-2, IMO Doc.
MSC.4/Circ. 157 (Aug. 1, 2010); IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:
Acts Reported During June 2010, Annex 1-2, IMO Doc. MSC.4/Circ. 156 (July 7,2010); IMO, Reports
on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: First Quarterly Report, Annex 1-2, IMO Doc.
MSC.4/Circ. 153 (June 9, 2010); IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:
Acts Reported During May 2010, Annex 1-2, IMO Doc. MSC.4/Circ. 155 (June 3, 2010); IMO, Reports
on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Acts Reported During April 2010, Annex 1-2,
IMO Doc. MSC.4/Circ. 154 (May 5, 2010).
18. See infra Section III.D.
19. SG's Report, supra note 1, pt. II(B), 8.
20. See INT'L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 9, at 38.
21. Piracy was the first international crime subject to universal jurisdiction. As early as 1820, the
United States Supreme Court stated that common law "recognises and punishes piracy as an offence,
not against its own municipal code, but as an offence against the law of nations .. .as an offence
against the universal law of society, a pirate being deemed an enemy of the human race." United States
v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161 (1820). See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for
International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 136-
51 (2001) (stating that under international law universal jurisdiction over piracy is well established);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 34 cmt. b (1965).
22. Eugene Kontorovich & Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of Universal Jurisdiction for
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Currently, the legal framework is comprised of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 23 which retained the provisions
relating to piracy of the earlier 1958 Convention on the High Seas,24 several other
international conventions, and pertinent Security Council and General Assembly
resolutions. In addition, several regional and sub-regional arrangements, along
with national efforts, are ongoing to fight piracy.
B. Applicable Conventions and Actions by the UN Security Council and General
Assembly
1. Conventional Norms
Customary international law on piracy is codified in the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea, which in section 100 obligates all states to cooperate to the
fullest possible extent in repressing piracy "on the high seas or in any other place
outside the jurisdiction of any State. 25 Piracy is defined in article 101 to consist
of "any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft. 26 Such an act must take place on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction
of any state and must be directed against another ship or aircraft, or the persons or
property on board such vessel.
27
It should be noted that the definition does not refer to either an attempt to
commit an act of piracy or to conspiracy relating to such an act, but it does include
voluntary participation or facilitation.2  Also, criminal acts constituting piracy do
not fall under the UNCLOS definition if they occur inside the territorial waters of a
state, but are called "armed robbery at sea" or "armed robbery against ships. 29
The IMO defines "armed robbery against ships" to mean any of the following acts:
1. any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof,
other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or
against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State's internal waters,
archipelagic waters and territorial sea;
30
2. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.31 State
action is authorized within the state's own exclusive economic zone.32
Piracy, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 436, 453 (2010).
23. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 100-07, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereafter UNCLOS].
24. Id.; Convention on the High Seas arts. 13-22, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S.
82.
25. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 100.




30. IMO, Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships, Annex 2.2.1, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 1025 (26) (Dec. 2, 2009); see also Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, arts. 3-4, Mar. 10, 1988,
1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereafter SUA Convention].
31. IMO, Code of Practice, supra note 30 2.2.2. The Code of Practice adopts the UNCLOS
2011
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UNCLOS Article 105 authorizes any state to seize a pirate ship or aircraft and
its property on board, arrest the crew, and prosecute them through its own courts,
so long as the seizure takes place on the high seas or on waters outside the
jurisdiction of any state. Under Article 107 only warships or military aircraft or
those on government service are authorized to undertake such seizures. 4
It is noteworthy that while UNCLOS authorizes universal jurisdiction it does
not make it obligatory for the states to take action.35 Acts which would constitute
piracy if committed on the high seas are referred to as "armed robbery at sea"
when committed within the territorial waters of a state.16 UNCLOS does not refer
to armed robbery at sea, which falls under the coastal state's jurisdiction in whose
territorial waters such acts are committed.37
Other conventions under which some acts of piracy may also be considered
offenses include the 1988 SUA Convention, which was primarily intended to apply
to acts of terrorism.38 It may be recalled that this convention was adopted in the
wake of the Achille Lauro incident in 1985, which involved an Italian flag cruise
ship seized by a faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization. 39 The hijackers
killed an elderly American citizen in a wheelchair and threw him overboard.40
Since the incident did not involve two ships nor were the hijackers motivated "for
private ends," the incident did not fit the UNCLOS definition of piracy; thus the
gap was filled by the adoption of the SUA Convention, which only binds states
parties since it has not yet attained the status of customary international law.41
The SUA Convention obligates states parties to establish a number of
criminal offenses, most of which correspond at least in part with actions committed
by pirates or armed robbers.42 It especially mandates that a party
take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over
the offences set forth in article 3 when the offence is committed: (a)
against or on board a ship flying the flag of the State at the time the
definition of piracy. Id. 2.1. Earlier, in November 2001, the 22nd Assembly of the IMO had adopted a
similar definition of "armed robbery against ships," as to mean "any unlawful act of violence or
detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, directed against a ship
or against persons or property on board such ship, within a State's jurisdiction over such offences."
IMO, Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships,
Annex 2.2, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 922 (22) (Jan. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships Code].
32. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 58.
33. Id. art. 105.
34. Id art. 107.
35. Id. art. 105.
36. Id. art. 101; see also Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Code, supra note 31, Annex
2.1, 2.2.1.
37. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Code, supra note 31, Annex TT 2.1, 2.2; see
UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 101
38. SUA Convention, supra note 30, para. 3.
39. SUE MAHAN & PAMALA L.GRISET, TERRORISM IN PERSPECTIVE 139 (2d ed. 2008).
40. Id.
41. See SUA Convention, supra note 30, 222 n.1 (listing the parties to the SUA Convention).
42. Id arts. 3, 5.
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offence is committed; or (b) in the territory of that State, including its
territorial sea; or (c) by a national of that State.
43
It also authorizes non-state parties to establish jurisdiction when the person
"seized, threatened, injured, or killed" is a national of that state and when the act is
intended to "compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act. 44
Furthermore, the Convention obligates the state in whose territory the alleged
offender is present to establish jurisdiction if it does not extradite the offender to
one of the states that has established jurisdiction.45 A special feature of the SUA
Convention is that it does not require that two ships be involved, nor does it
distinguish between maritime areas.46 Thus, it fills the gaps left by the rather
limited definition of piracy under UNCLOS.
In 2005, the states parties to the SUA Convention adopted a Protocol to the
Convention that extensively amended the Convention to keep its legal framework
up to date.47 It added a new article on the procedures for a state party requesting
the flag state of a suspect vessel for its authorization to board and search that
vessel, its cargo, and persons on board, thus providing the necessary legal basis to
states for intercepting acts of piracy.48
Other applicable conventions include the 1979 International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, 49 the 1999 International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,' ° and the 2000 United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. 1
2. Response by the United Nations
a. Security Council
As the incidents of piracy increased in 2008, the UN Security Council, acting
under Chapter VII, adopted several resolutions to counter piracy and armed
robbery at sea.52 That year it adopted more resolutions on piracy than on any other
43. Id. art. 6, 1.
44. Id. art. 6, 2.
45. Id. art. 6, 4.
46. See id. arts. 3-4.
47. IMO, Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, pmbl., IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21, Nov. 1, 2005, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 110-8 (2007) (entered into force July 28, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/87452.pdf. The US Congress has yet to adopt the necessary implementing legislation.
48. Id. art. 8bis.
49. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081,
1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
50. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999,
T.I.A.S. No. 13,075.
51. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, T.I.A.S.
No. 13,127, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.
52. See S.C. Res. 1897, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1816,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2,2008).
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subject. In Resolution 1816,53 adopted on June 2, 2008, it authorized member
states cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to take action
against pirates, even in Somalia's territorial waters ("hot pursuit"), for a period of
six months.54 This authorization was extended for one year under Security Council
Resolutions 1846 of December 2, 2008, 55 and 1851 of December 16, 2008.56
Subsequently, Resolution 1897 of November 30, 2009, further extended the scope
of permissible military force in Somalia's territorial waters for another twelve
months, and broadened the definition of piracy to include certain land-based
operations on the Somali mainland.57
The Security Council also noted in Resolution 1846 that the SUA Convention
"provides for parties to create criminal offenses, establish jurisdiction, and accept
delivery of persons responsible for or suspected of seizing or exercising control
over a ship by force or threat [of force] or any other form of intimidation," and
thus it urged states parties to the SUA Convention to fully implement their
obligations under the Convention, including cooperating with the IMO to "build
judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. 58
On December 16, 2008, the Security Council passed Resolution 1851, under
which it decided that states and regional organizations cooperating in the fight
against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia could "undertake
all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purposes of
suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea," in accordance with
applicable human rights law and international humanitarian law.59
Subsequently, in Resolution 1897 of November 30, 2009, it renewed its call
upon states and regional organizations that have the capacity to do so to deploy
53. S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 52.
54. Id. 7.
55. S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 52, 10.
56. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 52, 6.
57. S.C. Res. 1897, supra note 52, 7 ("[D]ecid[ing] that for a period of twelve months from the
date of this resolution to renew the authorizations as set out in paragraph 10 of Resolution 1846 (2008)
and paragraph 6 of Resolution 1851 (2008) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating
with the TFG [Transitional Federal Government] in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea
off the coast of Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided by the TFG to the Secretary-
General."); see S.C. Res. 1897, supra note 52, 2 (noting that escalating ransom payments and lack of
enforcement of the 1992 arms embargo contribute to piracy in off the coast of Somalia).
58. S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 52, 15; see also UN Experts Report on Somali Piracy, supra note
4, § 4.2.4.1:
The SUA Convention provides a legal basis to effect the rapid transit ashore of
pirates captured at sea where both the flag State and the receiving State are States
Parties to SUA. The receiving State Party to SUA is required to make an
immediate inquiry into the facts, and to notify other State Parties that might have
jurisdiction as to whether it intends to exercise its jurisdiction. The receiving
State Party is required to extradite such offenders to another State Party with
jurisdiction or to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution.
59. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 52, 6.
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"naval vessels, arms and military aircraft" and seize and dispose of "boats, vessels
arms and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable grounds
for suspecting such use. ' 60 It also emphasized the need to build judicial capacity
for the successful prosecution of operative paragraph 14.61
Finally, in Resolution 1918, adopted on April 27, 2010, the Security Council
called on member states to criminalize piracy under their domestic laws and to
favorably consider the prosecution and imprisonment of suspected pirates.62 It also
requested the Secretary General to present within three months a report on possible
options to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning those responsible for acts
of piracy off the coast of Somalia,
including, in particular, options for creating special domestic chambers
possibly with international components, a regional tribunal or an
international tribunal and corresponding imprisonment arrangements,
taking into account the work of the CGPCS [Contact Group on Piracy
Off the Coast of Somalia], the existing practice in establishing
international and mixed tribunals, and the time and the resources
necessary to achieve and sustain substantive results.
63
In response to the request from the Security Council, the Secretary General
presented a report on July 26, 20 10,64 identifying seven options for the Security
Council's consideration. The first option calls for the UN to enhance assistance to
build the capacity of regional states to prosecute and imprison suspected pirates.65
This the UN is already doing through the work of the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), and others, in assisting prosecutions and imprisonments in regional
states.66
The second option 67 involves establishment of a Somali court sitting in the
territory of another regional state and applying Somali law, either with or without
the United Nations' participation. This option derives from the example of the
Lockerbie Court, which did not have participation from either the UN or a regional
organization. 6 ' The necessary arrangements would have to be made through
negotiations between Somalia and the host state. If the United Nations was to
participate it would also require agreement between the UN, Somalia, and the host
state. However, as Somalia currently faces instability and other major challenges,
including that of its judicial system, there are no realistic prospects for the
implementation of this option, which therefore has to be a plan for the future.
60. S.C. Res. 1897, supra note 52, 3.
61. Id. 14.
62. S.C. Res. 1918, supra note 52, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1918 (Apr. 27, 2010).
63. Id. 4.
64. SG's Report, supra note 1.
65. Id. pt. V(B).
66. Id. pt. V(B), 55.
67. Id. pt. V(B).
68. Id. pt. V(B), 62.
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Option three69 envisages the establishment of a special chamber within the
national jurisdiction of a state or states in the region, without UN participation,
while the fourth option70 is the same arrangement but with UN participation. It
does not seem that in the near future either of these options holds great promise.
Somalia, as a failed state, lacks judicial capacity, although Kenya, Seychelles, the
United Republic of Tanzania, and Mauritius have judicial capacity in the region to
establish a special chamber,71 the cost involved and the logistics, with or without
the UN's participation, will present formidable hurdles to be overcome.
Option five 72 consists of a regional tribunal, not embedded in a national
jurisdiction but established on the basis of a multilateral agreement among regional
states and with the UN's participation. An agreement with the United Nations
would, however, be needed with this option, regarding the selection of judges,
prosecutors, etc. The sixth option 73 is an international tribunal on the basis of an
agreement between the United Nations and a state in the region. This would be
along the lines of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon.74
Finally, the seventh option75 establishes an international tribunal by Security
Council resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UN's participation
in the creation of a new judicial mechanism would require a Security Council
resolution requesting the Secretary General to negotiate an agreement with the
state concerned.76
The Security Council considered the Secretary General's options in a meeting
on August 25, 2010, in which the Council commended the ongoing efforts of
states, especially Kenya and Seychelles, to prosecute suspected pirates in their
national courts, and commended UNODC and other international entities assisting
these countries to prosecute suspected pirates in their national courts.77 It also
emphasized that it was necessary to have "peace, stability, development and
respect for human rights in Somalia" in order to find durable eradication of piracy
and armed robbery at sea off its coast.78 It asked the Contact Group on Piracy Off
the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) to consider the "advantages and disadvantages of
the various options" suggested by the Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon.79
Mr. Ban appointed former French Culture Minister and Education Minister,
69. Id. pt. V(B).
70. Id. pt. V(B).
71. Id. pt. IV(B), 27.
72. Id. pt. V(B).
73. Id. pt. V(B).
74. Id. pt. V(B), 90.
75. Id. pt. V(B).
76. Id. pt. V(B), 97.
77. Press Release, U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., Security Council Stresses Long-Term Solution
Needed to Problem of Prosecuting, Imprisoning, Pirates Operating Off Somalia's Coast, Welcomes






Jacques Lang, to advise him on legal issues relating to piracy off Somalia. 0
Devising an effective mechanism for prosecuting captured pirates and their
imprisonment is certainly one such important issue claiming the new adviser's
attention.
b. General Assembly
The General Assembly has considered piracy on an annual basis as part of its
discussions on "oceans and the law of the sea." In the latest such resolution from
December 4, 2009, 81 the UN General Assembly adopted a comprehensive
Resolution on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, similar to another resolution it had
adopted a year earlier.82 Several provisions relate to piracy. Among others, the
resolution states:
[T]he crucial role of international cooperation at the global, regional,
subregional and bilateral levels in combating, in accordance with
international law, threats to maritime security, including piracy, armed
robbery at sea, terrorist acts against shipping, offshore installations and
other maritime interests, through bilateral and multilateral instruments
and mechanisms aimed at monitoring, preventing and responding to
such threats, the enhanced sharing of information among States relevant
to the detection, prevention and suppression of such threats, and the
prosecution of offenders with due regard to national legislation, and the
need for sustained capacity-building to support such objectives.
83
After noting that piracy affects the entire range of vessels engaged in
maritime activities, the resolution emphasizes the "importance of promptly
reporting piracy incidents to enable accurate information on the scope of the piracy
problem, '84 and "[c]alls upon States to take appropriate steps under their national
laws so as to facilitate" apprehending and prosecuting suspected pirates.85 It also
urges states to "actively combat piracy" in cooperation with the IMO by adopting
measures to bring the "alleged perpetrators to justice. '86 Responding to the
concern of some states, it notes that the Security Council resolutions authorizing
state action in the territorial waters of Somalia and inland do not establish
customary international law and apply only to the situation in Somalia.
8 7
C. Response by the IMO, UNODC, UNDP, and Regional and Subregional Groups
1. Response by the IMO and Other Intergovernmental Organizations
The IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations that works in
cooperation with the shipping industry and nongovernmental organizations,88 and
80. Id
81. G.A. Res. 64/71, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/71 (Mar. 12,2010).
82. Id; G.A. Res. 63/111, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/111 (Feb. 12, 2009).





88. Introduction to IMO, IMO, http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx (2010).
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is the most effective organization in fighting piracy. Its activities pertaining to
piracy began as early as 1983, when the IMO Assembly adopted a resolution on
measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.89 Since then,
and especially since the 1990s, it has very actively and effectively addressed the
question of maritime piracy.
The IMO's initiatives have resulted in the establishment of several regional
and subregional arrangements aimed at preventing, deterring, and repressing acts
of piracy and armed robbery against ships.90 These include the 2004 Regional
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP); the
2008 Sub-Regional Coast Guard Network for the West and Central African
Regions, under the auspices of the Maritime Organization for West and Central
Africa (MOWCA); and the 2009 Djibouti Code of Conduct Concerning the
Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian
Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Djibouti Code of Conduct).91 Another important
initiative is the IMO's effort to improve maritime security, safety, and
environmental protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, which resulted
92in the 2007 Singapore Statement.
In addition to these initiatives creating regional arrangements, two recent
important sets of guidelines for effectively fighting piracy are noteworthy. First, in
September 2009, the IMO's Maritime Safety Committee updated its guidance on
combating piracy and armed robbery against ships and adopted a set of "best
management practices" to deter such attacks.93 The guidelines include several
recommendations related to travel routes and more technical advice regarding
preferred modes of communication and reporting, evasive maneuvering tactics,
and other defensive measures.94  Second, in December 2009, the IMO adopted a
guidance document in the form of the Code of Practice for the Investigation of
Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships 95 to foster regional
cooperation and to coordinate governments' actions.
89. IMO, Measures to Prevent Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, IMO Assemb.
Res. A. 545 (13) (Nov. 17, 1983).
90. Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery in Southeast Asia
art. 2, 1, Apr. 28, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 829 [hereinafter ReCAAP]; IMO, Code of Conduct Concerning the
Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of
Aden, Annex, IMO Council Doc. C 102/14 (Apr. 3, 2009), available at http://www.imo.org/
OurWork/Security/PIU/Documents/DCoC%/ 2OEnglish.pdf [hereinafter Djibouti Code of Conduct];
About MOWCA, MAR. ORG. OF W. & CENT. AFR. [MOWCA], http://www.mowca.org/new / 20design/
about-mowca.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
91. ReCAAP, supra note 90; Djibouti Code of Conduct, supra note 90; MOWCA, supra note 90.
92. IMO, Singapore Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security and Environmental Protection
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, IMO Doc. IMO/SGP 1/4 (Sept. 6, 2007), available at
www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/pdf/spore statement.pdf [hereinafter Singapore Statement].
93. IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Waters Off the Coast of Somalia: Best
Management Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf ofAden and Off the Coast of Somalia Developed by
the Industry, 5-6, IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ.1335 (Sept. 29, 2009).
94. Id. Annex 2.
95. IMO, Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships, Annex, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 1025 (26) (Jan. 18, 2010).
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Among other UN bodies, UNODC set up its program to support piracy
prosecutions in May 2009.96 The organization's assistance is especially focused on
Kenya and Seychelles, although it has also provided support in the Puntland and
Somaliland regions of Somalia.97  UNODC has trained police in modem
investigatory procedures and supplied the police with cars, offices, etc. 98  In
Kenya, it has supported the criminal justice system; it has trained the judiciary and
renovated courtrooms, introduced computers and provided defense lawyers; it has
refurbished prisons, providing medical facilities among other improvements; and
has undertaken similar capacity building and support programs in Seychelles,
where the European Commission has entered into partnership with it.99 The UNDP
has been engaged in training for the judiciary and police and has also supported
court infrastructure in each of the regions of Somalia. 100
2. Regional and Subregional Groups
a. The 2004 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), 01 signed in 2004 and in force since
September 4, 2006, was a pioneering attempt at a regional arrangement aimed
exclusively at fighting piracy and armed robbery in the Malacca and Singapore
Straits, another major area then being targeted by pirates. Japan played a leading
role in bringing the states together by issuing the "Tokyo Appeal" in March 2000
and "Tokyo Action Plan" the following month. 102
Under the treaty, the sixteen states parties 10 3 are to "make every effort to take
effective measures" in preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery
against ships, arresting pirates or those who have committed armed robbery against
ships, seizing ships or aircraft used in committing such acts, as well as ships taken
by them and the property on board such ships, and rescuing victim ships and
victims of such acts.
10 4
The member states agreed in the ReCAAP initiative to enhance their
multilateral cooperation in three areas: sharing of information regarding piracy (the
Information Sharing Centre (ISC)) by coordinating communications and exchange
of information, expediting responses to attacks, and recording and analyzing
96. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Counter Piracy Programme, at 3 (Nov.




99. Id. at 6-7.
100. SG's Report, supra note 1, pt. IV(B), 28.
101. ReCAAP, supra note 90.
102. Id. para. 5.
103. The parties are Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, People's Republic of China, India, Indonesia,
Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and
Vietnam. ReCAAP, supra note 90, art. 18, 1.
104. Id. art 3.
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statistics, all through a secure web-based information network system;
10 5
improving the anti-piracy capabilities of the member states through exercises,
training workshops, and programs for technical assistance to share best practices
among the members; and establishing cooperative arrangements for fighting
piracy, such as between "governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental
organisations" and institutes doing relevant research, to which it gives the status of
* ,106partner organisations.
As this arrangement was so successful in preventing and deterring piracy in
the region, the IMO in November 2007 called upon East African states to adopt a
similar agreement to fight piracy. 10 7  The IMO sponsored meetings in Yemen,
Oman, and Tanzania to explore the possibility of creating such an arrangement
among states in the Western Indian Ocean. 108  The UN Security Council
recommended in its Resolution 1851 that Eastern African states follow this
example to coordinate their activities in the Horn of Africa; the outcome was the
2009 Djibouti Code of Conduct, 10 9 which will be discussed below.
b. The 2007 Singapore Statement
This IMO initiative began in Jakarta, Indonesia, in September 2005.110 It
continued with a meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in September 2006,111
followed by a meeting in Singapore in September 2007, where states signed the
Singapore Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security and Environmental
Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.1 12 The states parties affirmed
that "the primary responsibility over the safety of navigation, environmental
protection and maritime security in the Straits lies with the littoral States,"'11 3 and
agreed to continue their efforts toward "enhancing maritime security in the
Straits. 11 a This regional arrangement among Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore,
and subsequently Thailand, was primarily responsible for curbing piracy in that
region.
105. Id. arts. 7, 9-10; see also RECAAP ISC, http://www.recaap.org/index home.html (last visited
Nov. 12, 2010).
106. RECAAP ISC, supra note 105, Cooperative Arrangements.
107. IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Waters Off the Coast of Somalia, 7, IMO
Assemb. Res. A. 1002 (25) (Dec. 6, 2007) (adopted Nov. 29, 2007).
108. IMO, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Fifth Session, 18.13, IMO Doc.
MSC 85/26 (Dec. 19, 2008).
109. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 52 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); Djibouti Code
of Conduct, supra note 90, para. 6.
110. IMO, Jakarta Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security and Environmental Protection in
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Annex 2, IMO Doc. IMO/JKT 1/2, C/ES.23/8 (Sept. 8, 2005),
available at http://www.sjofartsverket.se/upload/5926/23-8.pdf.
111. IMO, Kuala Lumpur Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security and Environmental
Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, IMO Doc. IMO/KUL 1/4 (Sept. 20, 2006),
available at www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data id%3 D 15677/kualalumpurstatement.pdf.
112. Singapore Statement, supra note 92.




c. The 2008 Sub-Regional Coast Guard Network for the West and Central African
Regions under the Auspices of MOWCA.
MOWCA comprises 20 coastal and five landlocked countries from
Mauritania to Angola.1 5 An intergovernmental institution based in Abidjan, Cote
d'Ivoire, MOWCA was established in May 1975 and its long-term objective is to
provide "'profitable maritime and auxiliary services, with greater security, more
safety and less pollution.' 1 6  Several developed countries and international
organizations, including the IMO and the AU, support MOWCA's efforts.
117
Among its projects and programs are the establishment of maritime safety and
security, marine environmental protection, and the creation of an "institutional
framework for cooperation and integration." '118 Since 1999, one of its major
projects has been to protect vessels from piracy, along with terrorism and
pollution.11 9
In July 2008, through a Memorandum of Understanding, MOWCA
established a Sub-Regional Integrated Coast Guard Network in West and Central
Africa,1 20 aimed at combating piracy and armed robbery; enhancing maritime
safety, security, and search and rescue; and marine environmental protection in the
coastal waters.121 This is a comprehensive agreement under which parties have
assumed obligations to coordinate their national legislation, practices and
procedures, and policies related to safeguarding maritime trade, providing security
for safe operation of port facilities and ships, and effective protection of the marine
environment. 22 They are also obligated to prosecute "perpetrators of all forms of
piracy and unlawful acts against seafarers, ships, port facility personnel and port
facilities,"123 and to establish the Maritime Fund in each member state.1
24
Parties make the obligation at the regional level "to combat piracy, armed
robbery against ships, unlawful acts and transnational organized crime at sea by
enhancing the regional maritime security strategies and multilateral co-operation in
their implementation; 1 25 to take effective cooperative measures so that pirates do
115. MOWCA, supra note 90.
116. Id. pt. IV.
117. Id.
118. Projects & Programs, MOWCA, www.mowca.org/new%/o20design/projects-programs.html
(last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
119. Id.
120. Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Sub-Regional Integrated Coast
Guard Network in West and Central Africa,13th Sess., July 29-31, 2008, MOWCA, MOWCA Doc.
MOWCA/XIII GA.08/8, available at http://www.mowca.org/new / 20design/MOWCA / 20draft
% 20final%20E%20and 0o20F[1] doc%20Addico%20fmal.rtf [hereinafter MOWCA MOU].
121. Strategy of MOWCA Sub-Region in Suppressing Piracy, Armed Robbery and Other Unlawful
Acts Against Shipping, Responding to Maritime Accidents and Protecting the Marine Environment,
MOWCA, www.mowca.org/new%/o20design/strategyofinowcamemberstatesoncoastguard.html (last
visited Nov. 10, 2010).
122. MOWCA MOU, supra note 120, art. 4, 1.
123. Id. art. 4, 5.
124. Id. art. 4, 6.
125. Id. art. 6, 4.
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not evade prosecution, conviction, and punishment; 126 to share information and
ensure naval cooperation; and to become parties to and implement the pertinent
international conventions, including the 1988 SUA Convention and its 1988 and
2005 protocols.
127
The network comprises four coast guard zones with four zonal coordinating
centers and two principal coordinating centers. 12  "States Parties recognize the
right of hot pursuit."129  MOWCA's institutional arrangements indeed are an
exemplary model for other regions.
d. The Djibouti Code of Conduct
An important regional instrument, the Djibouti Code of Conduct was
developed under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) on
January 29, 2009.130 Sixteen regional states, signatories to the Djibouti Code, 131 a
nonbinding instrument, have declared their intention to review their national
legislation "with a view towards ensuring that there are national laws in place to
criminalize piracy and armed robbery against ships, and adequate guidelines for
the exercise of jurisdiction, conduct of investigations, and prosecutions of alleged
offenders. 13 The signatory states have also committed to "facilitate coordinated,
timely, and effective information flow" among themselves through a system of
national focal points and information centers. 
133
D. Response by NATO, the EU, Coalitions of States, and National Efforts
1. Introduction
The international community has responded to the growing threat of piracy in
the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast by undertaking naval operations to deter
pirates and to ensure the safety of commercial maritime routes and international
navigation. These operations have been coordinated by NATO, the EU, and a
coalition led by the United States, in addition to several countries operating on
their own. Apart from the naval response there have been numerous coordinated
efforts, as well as by states acting alone, at capacity building in affected countries
to strengthen their criminal justice systems so that pirates can be apprehended,
prosecuted, and convicted.
2. NATO
Pursuant to the request of UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, NATO
provided escorts to the UN World Food Programme vessels transiting through the
126. Id. art. 6, 6-7.
127. Id. art. 6, 2, 10.
128. Id. art. 12.
129. Id art. 55.
130. Djibouti Code of Conduct, supra note 90, 7.
131. The signatories are Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar,
Maldives, Mauritius, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania,
and Yemen. Signatory States, IMO, http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/Signatory-
States.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
132. Djibouti Code of Conduct, supra note 90, art. 11.
133. Id. art. 8.
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Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa under Operation Allied Provider between
October and December 2008, in order to provide humanitarian aid to Somalia.
134
In March 2009, NATO expanded its role in counter-piracy efforts with the
launching of the successor Operation Allied Protector to contribute to the "safety
of commercial maritime routes and international navigation" by helping to deter,
defend against, and disrupt pirate activities in the area. 135  Canada, Denmark,
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and the United States
routinely contributed to the NATO naval force conducting the operation.
136
That operation lasted until August 2009 and since that time NATO has been
conducting Operation Ocean Shield. 137 The Alliance has broadened its mission to
include assistance to regional states at their request to develop their own capacity,
such as strengthening their local coast guard, to combat piracy activities."'
3. European Union
The European Union's operation EU-NAVFOR Somalia, known as operation
"Atalanta," is conducted in support of UN Security Council resolutions 1814,
1816, 1838, 1846, and 1897.139 According to the EU Council Decision of
December 8, 2008, the EU's first ever maritime operation was launched "to
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed
robbery off the Somali coast." 140  The operation became fully operational in
February 2009. Specifically, it has responsibility for ensuring the protection of 1)
shipments of the World Food Programme carrying food aid to displaced persons in
Somalia and 2) vulnerable cruising vessels off the Somali coast.141 In general, its
objective is to deter, prevent, and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea in
that area.142 On June 14, 2010, the Council of the EU decided to extend the
mandate of the Operation until December 12, 2012.143 The Operation has taken the
leading role in the SHADE (Shared Awareness and Deconfliction) mechanism to
promote coordination among international, regional, and national naval forces
operating in the area.
144
In the first EU-NAVFOR operation to result in court judgment, a Mombasa
Law Courts Chief Magistrate sentenced seven Somali pirates who were
apprehended by a EU-NAVFOR warship after they attacked a German naval
134. Counter-Piracy Operations, N. ATL. TREATY ORG. (NATO), http://www.nato.int/issues/allied-
provider/index.html (last updated Apr. 2, 2009).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Operation Ocean Shield, NATO, http://www.aco.nato.int/page208433730.aspx?print=Y.
138. Id.
139. EU Common Security and Defense Policy: EUNA VFOR Somalia, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1518&lang=en (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
140. Council Decision 2008/918, 2008 O.J. (L 330) 19 (EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:330:0019:0020:EN:PDF.
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tanker. 145 As of September 2010, EU-NAVFOR had transferred 75 suspects to
Kenyan authorities for prosecution on piracy charges.
146
An initiative established by EU-NAVFOR with close collaboration from
industry, the Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), is designed
as a coordinating center to provide a service to mariners in the Gulf of Aden, the
Somali Basin, and off the Horn of Africa. 147 This it does by safeguarding freedom
of navigation, in the light of increasing piracy attacks, in support of UN Security
Council's resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, and 1846.148 Military and merchant navy
personnel from several countries operate the Centre, and ship owners and ship
masters register their movements through the region with MSCHOA and receive
information and guidance to reduce the risk of pirate attacks.
149
4. Combined Task Force 151
Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) is a "multinational task force
established in January 2009" to conduct counter-piracy operations off the Eastern
coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, 150 "covering an area of approximately
1.1 million square miles. 15 1 The Task Force operates under a mandate of the 25-
nation Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), which patrols approximately "2.5
million square miles of international waters" to ensure safety of the seas in that
area. 152 It does this essentially by fighting terrorism, preventing piracy, and
reducing illegal trafficking.1 53 CTF-151's primary responsibility, to actively deter
and suppress piracy, is aimed at protecting global maritime security and securing
international freedom of "navigation for the benefit of all nations. 154
To illustrate one of the Task Force's many activities to deter piracy, US
Marines operating in the Gulf of Aden boarded a German-owned vessel, M/V
Magellan Star, on September 9, 2010, and seized control from pirates who had
attacked and boarded the vessel a day earlier. 15  The Marines returned control of
the ship to the civilian mariners, ensuring safety of the ship's crew. 15 6 There were
145. Press Release, Eur. Union Naval Force Pub. Affairs Office, Verdict for the First EU NAVFOR
Case in Kenya (Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/09/verdict-for-the-first-eu-
navfor-case-in-kenya/ [hereinafter EU NAVFOR Press Release].
146. Id.
147. About MSCHOA and OP ATALANTA, MAR. SEC. CTR. HORN OF AFR.,
http://www.mschoa.org/Pages/About.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, COMBINED MAR. FORCES, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/
151/index.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
151. Id.
152. Combined Maritime Forces, COMBINED MAR. FORCES, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/
cmf command.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
153. Id.
154. Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, supra note 150.
155. Jeffrey Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Marines Free Ship and Capture Somali Pirates
Without Bloodshed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2010, at A4; Press Release, U.S. Naval Forces Cent.
Command, Maritime Raid Force Recaptures Ship from Pirates (Sept. 9, 2010), available at
www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2010/104.html.
156. Gettleman & Schmitt, supra note 155; U.S. Naval Forces Cent. Command, supra note 155.
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no injuries and nine pirates were captured, remaining under "control of CTF-151,
pending further disposition."
' 157
5. The Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia
Following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1851, the United
States took the lead in creating the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of
Somalia on January 14, 2009.158 The primary objective is to coordinate an
effective international response to piracy in that region. This is a voluntary
international forum that has brought together almost 50 countries and several
international organizations-the African Union, the League of Arab States,
INTERPOL, IMO, NATO, and the UN Secretariat-as well as two major maritime
industry groups that take part as observers.15 9 The participants have established
four working groups: military and operational coordination, information sharing,
and capacity building, chaired by the United Kingdom; legal issues, chaired by
Denmark; commercial industry coordination, chaired by the United States; and
public information, chaired by Egypt. 
160
At the sixth plenary meeting of the Contact Group at the UN Headquarters in
New York on June 10, 2010,161 participants agreed that, for a viable solution for
ending piracy, the root causes on land have to be addressed effectively, and thus
they emphasized the need for regional capacity building. 162  The meeting
underlined the central importance of adherence to the Best Management Practices
guide, whose purpose is to "assist ships to avoid, deter, or delay piracy attacks" in
the area.163 The Contact Group stated that international efforts to restrict support
for pirates should include "tracking and freezing" pirates' assets to deter their
operations.
164
In January 2010, the Contact Group established a Trust Fund to help countries
in the region fight piracy, the main objective of which is to "build capacity in their
criminal-justice systems so they can prosecute" suspected pirates. 16  Then, in
April, the Board of the Trust Fund decided to undertake five projects focused
primarily on efforts to prosecute suspected pirates. Four of these projects are
designed to help strengthen institutions in Seychelles and the autonomous Somali
157. U.S. Naval Forces Cent. Command, supra note 155.
158. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Contact Grp. on Piracy Off the Coast of Som. (May 18,
2009), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/O5/123584.htm.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy
Off the Coast of Som. (June 11, 2010), available at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/06/143010.htm
[hereinafter Plenary Meeting].
162. Id.
163. BIMCO ET AL., BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICE 3: PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA AND
ARABIAN SEA AREA 1 (3d version, 2010), available at www.marad.dot.gov/documents/PiracyBest
Management Practices 3.pdf.
164. Plenary Meeting, supra note 161.
165. Press Conference, U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., Press Conference on Work of Contact Grp. on
Piracy Off Somali Coast (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2010/100128_
Somalia.doc.htm.
2011
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
regions of Puntland and Somaliland relating to "mentoring prosecutors and police,
building and renovating prisons, reviewing domestic laws in piracy and increasing
the capacity of local courts." 166 The fifth project is designed to help local media
disseminate anti-piracy messages within Somalia.
6. National Legal Responses
Several states have enacted laws to criminalize piracy and to prosecute
alleged pirates in their courts. These include Kenya and Seychelles in Africa,
several European countries, and the United States. The UN Secretary-General
noted in his report that ten states are currently prosecuting acts of piracy.
1 67
a. Africa and Europe
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1851 of December 16, 2008, which
had urged states and regional organizations to conclude special agreements with
countries willing to take custody of and prosecute pirates, Kenya entered into
several agreements-with the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United
States, Denmark, China, and Canada. 168 It would be desirable if more states in the
region would allow prosecutions of pirates in their courts, but no such additional
agreements have been reached as of September 2010.
In April 2010, the Kenyan government announced that it would no longer
prosecute pirates because its legal system was overburdened and the international
community had not provided sufficient support. 16 9 However, Kenya subsequently
resumed the adjudication of piracy cases in May after receiving assurances of
additional support.170 In July, Kenya opened a new high-security courtroom near
Mombasa with funds donated by the European Union and several countries, and
channeled through UNODC. 17 1 EU-NAVFOR alone has turned over 75 suspects
to the Kenyan authorities since its deployment.1 72 In September 2010, Kenya was
reported to have convicted fourteen Somali men accused of acts of piracy.
1 73
166. U.N. News Serv., UN Trust Fund Backs Projects in Fight Against Piracy Off Somali Coast
(Apr. 23, 2010), www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=34472.
167. These are Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia (in the Somaliland and Puntland regions), Maldives,
Yemen, the Netherlands, United States, France, Spain, and Germany. SG's Report, supra note 1, pt.
IV(A), 19.
168. James Thuo Gathii, Kenya's Piracy Prosecutions, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 416-17 (2010).
169. Hillary Stemple, UN Announces Opening of New Kenya Courtroom for Piracy Trials, JURIST
(June 25, 2010), available at http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/06/un-announces-opening-of-new-kenya-
courtroom-for-piracy-trials.php.
170. Hillary Stemple, UN Announces $9.3 Million in Donations to Fund Piracy Courts, JURIST
(June 15, 2010), available at http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/06/un-announces-93-million-in-
donations-to-fund-piracy-courts.php.
171. Mike Pflanz, At Last, a Court to Try Somali Pirates, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 8, 2010,
available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0708/At-last-a-court-to-try-Somali-pirates.
172. EU NAVFOR Press Release, supra note 145.
173. Zach Zagger, Kenya Court Convicts 7 More Somali Pirates, JURIST (Sept. 24, 2010, 1:53 PM),
available at http://jurist.org/paperchase/201 0/09/kenya-court-convicts-7-more-somali-pirates.php; see
also EU NAVFOR Press Release, supra note 145 (discussing the first seven convictions).
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Seychelles was the second state in the region to set up a UN-backed regional
center for prosecution of suspected pirates. 174 In the course of the Security Council
meeting on August 25, 2010, the country's delegate informed the Council that
Seychelles' Supreme Court had sentenced 11 Somali pirates to ten years in prison
each and another 29 suspects were awaiting trial.
175
The first European trial of Somali pirates for hijacking a cargo ship registered
in the Netherlands Antilles commenced in the Netherlands District Court of
Rotterdam on May 25, 2010.176 They were convicted and sentenced to five years
each, while another Dutch court approved the extradition of ten other Somali
piracy suspects to Hamburg, Germany.
177
b. United States
In 2007 President George W. Bush signed the US policy on piracy and armed
robbery at sea, which was developed after years of deliberation. 178 It provides for
taking unilateral and cooperative action to prevent, interrupt, and terminate pirate
acts; facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates; "preserve the freedom of the
seas;" and "protect sea lines of communication," among others. 17 9 It also provides
for the implementation of this policy through an inter-agency process.
180
Subsequently, in December 2008, the US National Security Council released
an action plan implementing the policy.181 The plan seeks to involve all nations,
international organizations, and industry, among others that are interested to take
steps to repress piracy in that region. 182 It focuses on operational measures for
prevention, disruption, and punishment of acts of Somali pirate organizations.
183
As part of the Maritime Administration Action Plan on addressing this problem,
pertinent information and advice to counter piracy and armed robbery is provided
to assist ship owners, operators, and the maritime industry in preventing ship
hijackings.184
174. U.N. News Serv., Seychelles to Launch UN-Backed Courts to Combat Piracy (May 5, 2010),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=34601&Cr=piracy&Crl =&Kwl=pirate&Kw2=&Kw
3=#.
175. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., supra note 77, para. 96.
176. Sarah Miley, Dutch Court Begins Europe's First Somali Pirate Trial, JURIST (May 25, 2010,
10:30 AM), available at http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/05/dutch-court-begins-europes-first-somali-
pirate-trial.php.
177. Spencer Swartz, WorldNews: Somali Pirates Sentenced for Ship Attack, WALL ST. J., June 18,
2010, at All.
178. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush on Mar. Sec. (Piracy) Policy to the Vice
President (June 14, 2007), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/06/2007
0614-3.html.
179. Id. pt. III.
180. Id. pt. IV.
181. U.S. NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, COUNTERING PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA: PARTNERSHIP &
ACTION PLAN 3, (2008), available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/CounteringPiracyOff
The Horn of Africa_-_Partnership Action Plan.pdf
182. Id.
183. Id. at 3-4.
184. Horn of Africa Piracy, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., MAR. ADMIN, www.marad.dot.gov/news
_room landingjnage/horn of africajniracy/horn of africaniracy.htm
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The United States Constitution in Article 1 grants Congress the power to
"define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and
Offences against the Law of Nations." 185 In a decision on August 17, 2010, United
States v. Said, a federal district court construed the statute defining piracy, which
was originally enacted in 1819. 186 The statute reads: "Whoever, on the high seas,
commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards
brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. ' 187 The
court also noted other related federal statutes on Attack to Plunder a Vessel,
188
Acts of Violence Against Persons on a Vessel, 189 Conspiracy to Perform Acts of
Violence Against Persons on a Vessel, 190 Assault with a Dangerous Weapon on
Federal Officers and Employees, 191 Conspiracy Involving Firearm and a Crime of
Violence, 192 and Use of Firearm During a Crime of Violence. 193
The court dismissed the piracy count of a five-count indictment against
defendant Said and his co-defendants, all of whom were passengers aboard a skiff
from which shots were fired on the USS Ashland in the Gulf of Aden in April
2010.194 The defendants had asked for such dismissal because they did not board
nor did they take control of the US ship or take anything from it.195 In response,
the government's argument was that the motion should be denied because
historically piracy is not limited to the common law definition of robbery on land
and has included conduct beyond robbery. 196  Specifically, the prosecution's
assertion was that, as defined by the "law of nations," any unauthorized violent act
or attack committed on the high seas against another ship suffices to constitute
piracy, which does not require the actual taking of property. 
197
The court began its analysis by noting that the language of the piracy statute
did not provide any guidance on the scope of piracy under the law of nations, and
thus it must examine the pertinent case law. 198 It relied upon an 1820 case decided
by the US Supreme Court, United States v. Smith,199 "the only case to ever directly
examine the definition of piracy under § 1651" 200 as the governing authority, and
185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
186. United States v. Said, No. CRI.A.2:10cr57, 2010 WL 3893761, at *2-3 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17,
2010).
187. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2010).
188. 18 U.S.C. § 1659 (2010).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(6) (2010).
190. 18 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(9) (2010).
191. 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)-(b) (210).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) (2010).
193. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).
194. United States v. Said, No. CRI.A.2:10cr57, 2010 WL 3893761, at *2-3 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17,
2010).
195. Id at *1.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id at *4.
199. Id.; United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820).




stated that since the defendants "did not board, take control or otherwise rob the
USS Ashland," they did not commit the offense of "piracy" as defined by the
Supreme Court in Smith.20 1
The Court observed that, as with every criminal statute, piracy under the law
of nations is subject to constitutional due process, requiring fair warning before the
statute is enforced against the defendant.2 2 Thus, enforcement of a "statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application" is barred.20 3 It also referred to the canon of strict construction of
criminal statutes.20 4
The court noted that the law of nations means "customary international law,"
and defined the term as it is normally defined, to wit: international law principles
that "countries must universally abide by ... out of a sense of legal obligation and
mutual concern.,
205
In Smith,20 6 the US Supreme Court had concluded that writers on the common
law, the maritime law, and the law of nations "universally treat piracy as an
offense against the law of nations, and that its true definition by that law is robbery
upon the sea., 20 7 The Said court found that this definition had been reiterated and
followed without exception-it had "reached a level of concrete consensus in
United States law since its pronouncement in 1820. "208
As mentioned above, the defendants in Said thus argued that the statute could
not be read to include the charged conduct.20 9 Their rationale was that, although
the statute did not define "piracy," the term, derived from "the law of nations," did
not encompass a shooting without a concomitant robbery at sea. 10 On the other
hand, the government's position was that, even if "piracy" was defined in Smith
and subsequent cases as "robbery or forcible depredation," the term included many
crimes beyond robbery, including defendants' alleged attack on the US vessel with
an AK-47 rifle.211
The court rejected the government's argument, stating that
"depredation" itself is defined as "the act of plundering: pillaging,.
[or] the act of plundering; a robbing; a pillaging. 212 Thus, the court
stated:
201. Id at *3-4, *11.
202. Id. at *4.
203. Id at *2 (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997)).
204. Id. at *3.
205. Id. at *2 (citing Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 144 (2d Cir. 2003)).
206. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820).
207. Smith, 18 U.S. at 161, quoted in United States v. Said, No. CRI.A.2:10cr57, 2010 WL
3893761, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2010).
208. Said, 2010 WL 3893761, at *4.
209. Id. at *3.
210. Id. at *7-8.
211. Id. at *6.
212. Id. at *6 (citations omitted).
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This definition does not include acts of assault or aggression, and
Justice Story's use of the terms "robbery" and "forcible depredations"
[in Smith] does not embrace the conduct charged against Defendants.
Accordingly, the Government's argument is both an expansion and a
misinterpretation of Smith and it would be erroneous for the Court to
agree with it.
In sum, the Government simply fails to cite to one case in United
States jurisprudence in which the Defendant was criminally prosecuted
for "piracy in violation of the law of nations," for conduct that fell short
of robbery or seizure of a ship. Finding none, this Court concludes that
the Supreme Court in Smith set forth the authoritative definition of
piracy as robbery or forcible depredations on the high seas, i.e., sea
robbery.213
The court did not find the cases cited by the government to support the
expanded scope of the definition of piracy persuasive.214 It also reviewed the
statutory history of Section 1651 and found that subsequent Congressional actions
since the enactment of the statute have continued to support the Smith definition of
piracy.215
Next, the court reviewed the traditional sources as evidence of customary
international law: conventions, case law, and the writings of publicists or scholars,
and concluded that contemporary international law sources are not consistent on
the definition of piracy.216 The court did refer to the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas217 and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,218 and the
British Privy Council case In re Piracy Jure Gentium,21 9 all of which would have
included the conduct charged against these defendants in Said as piracy, but also
noted that there is no consensus among scholars on the matter.220
Finally, the court determined that constitutional due process constraints
prevented it from construing the piracy statute to extend the Smith definition of
piracy because "[t]he Smith Court held that [Section] 1651 was not
unconstitutionally vague because piracy under the law of nations had a specified
meaning: robbery at sea. 221 In the Said court's words,
Given the flexible manner in which international sources treat the
definition of piracy, and that these sources inherently conflict with
Supreme Court precedent, the Court's reliance on these international
sources as authoritative would not meet constitutional muster [of due
213. United States v. Said, No. CRI.A.2:10cr57, 2010 WL 3893761, at *6 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17,
2010).
214. Id. at *5.
215. Id. at *6-7.
216. Id. at *8-10.
217. Id at *8; see also Convention on the High Seas, supra note 24, art. 15.
218. Id. at *8; see also UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 101.
219. Said, 2010 WL 3893761, at *8 (citing In re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586 (P.C.)).
220. Id at *8-9.
221. Id at *10 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 162 (1820)).
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process] and must therefore be rejected. The Smith definition of piracy
as sea robbery, on the other hand, is clear and authoritative.
222
In its sole reliance on Smith-concluding that since there is no robbery there
is no piracy, despite the defendants' attempt at piracy-the Said court misses the
point. Not to extend the definition of piracy beyond that in Smith seems
unwarranted, especially in view of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and the
1982 UNCLOS, both of which are widely accepted as codifications of the
customary international law. However, even if there might be some doubt whether
the conventions had indeed been codified customary international law, as a party to
the 1958 Convention the United States is bound to comply by enforcing its terms
in US courts. In any event, it seems appropriate to quote the British Privy Council
in its 1934 decision, In re Piracy Jure Gentium:
When it is sought to be contended ... that armed men sailing the seas
on board a vessel, without any commission from any State, could attack
and kill everybody on board another vessel, sailing under a national
flag, without committing the crime of piracy unless they stole, say, an
article worth sixpence, their Lordships are almost tempted to say that a
little common sense is a valuable quality in the interpretation of
international law.
223
Ten days after the decision in Said was announced, the Somali suspect, Jama
Idle Ibrahim, pleaded guilty to several charges of attacking to plunder a vessel,
committing an act of violence against persons on a vessel, and the use of a firearm
in the commission of a crime of violence. 224 Under the plea agreement he will
receive a thirty-year sentence and the sentencing hearing will be on November 29,
2010.225 Earlier, in May 2010, a Somali man pled guilty to charges of hijacking
the container ship Maersk Alabama, kidnapping its captain, hostage taking, and
226conspiracy.
IV. APPRAISAL
The United Nations and its specialized agencies, regional organizations,
coalitions of states, as well as several states independently, have in the last few
years taken numerous robust measures to repress piracy. However,
notwithstanding these actions piracy persists as a major threat to maritime
navigation, especially with continuous attacks off the Coast of West Africa and in
the Far East.
222. Id. at *11.
223. In re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586 (P.C.) 594.
224. Warren Richey, Somali Pleads Guilty in Case of Pirate Attack on US Warship, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 27, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/0827/Somali-
pleads-guilty-in-case-of-pirate-attack-on-US-warship.
225. Id.
226. Ray Rivera, Somali Man Pleads Guilty in 2009 Hqacking of Ship, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2010,
at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/19/nyregion/19pirate.html.
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To illustrate, the IMO reported 46 acts of piracy and armed robbery against
ships in August 2010.227 On September 23, 2010, the Associated Press reported
pirates' failed attempt to take over an offshore oil platform in the Gulf of Guinea,
along Nigeria's coast.228 While clashing with the Nigerian army and retreating, the
pirates kidnapped three French employees of a marine services company.229 On
the same day, the BBC reported that the IMO received a petition signed by more
than 930,000 seafarers, calling for immediate global action to halt piracy.230 The
signatories urged governments to take immediate steps to secure the release of
kidnapped sailors, numbering 354 taken by Somali pirates alone.231 They also
called for 'significant resources and concerted efforts to find real solutions to the
growing piracy problem."'
232
The situation has worsened for many reasons, including the geographical
expansion by pirates of their operations to hundreds of miles from the coast. The
vast distances involved, requiring millions of square miles to be covered by naval
forces, adds to the difficulties of preventing and deterring piracy.233
In addition, pirates have begun investing their ransom money in heavy
weapons and land-based militias, and both the Somali government officials and al-
Shabaab leaders of the militant Islamicist insurgency are reportedly wooing the
pirates.234  Thus far, al-Shabaab has been funding its operations by taxing
businesses in the territory it controls, along with contributions from its supporters
abroad.235 Its leaders are now reportedly using the pirates to raise money, which
adds further complications.236 Finally, restoration of law and order in Somalia
remains illusory, as the security situation seems to be worsening. Hence, the long-
term solution to the piracy problem that has to be political is nowhere in sight.
227. IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships -- Acts reported during
August 2010, MSC.4/Circ.159 (September 1, 2010); see also IMO, CURRENT AwARENEss BULLETIN
(July 2010), available at http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/CurrentAwarenessBulletin/Documents/
CAB%20165%o2OJulyo202010.pdf (monthly bulletin giving maritime news, including news from the
IMO and the United Nations, and maritime news in the press); Piracy and Security, LLOYD'S LIST,
www.lloydslist.com/ll/sector/piracy-and-security (daily news and analysis for the global maritime
industry).
228. Greg Keller, 3 French Employees Kidnapped from Ship off Nigeria, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept.
23, 2010, available at http://www.wfaa.com/news/world/103524974.html.
229. Pirates Attack Oil Platform, Kidnap French Workers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2010, at A18,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703860104575508263862382210.html.





234. Jeffrey Gettleman, In Somali Civil War, Both Sides Embrace Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2,
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If, for various reasons, prevention and deterrence of piratical attacks cannot
be ensured, effective mechanisms for apprehending and prosecuting alleged
pirates, their detention and imprisonment, and extradition where appropriate, must
be in place to serve two purposes: 1) as deterrence, and 2) to hold the perpetrators
accountable.237 It is worth recalling that the UN Security Council, in a preambular
paragraph to Resolution 1851, noted that "the lack of capacity, domestic
legislation, and clarity about how to dispose of pirates after their capture, has
hindered more robust international action against the pirates off the coast of
Somalia and in some cases led to pirates being released without facing
justice.... ,,238
In reality, the needed mechanisms, logistics, and facilities to ensure
apprehension and prosecution, detention, extradition, and imprisonment are barely
in place. First, many countries, including the United States, have yet to update
their criminal laws to provide such authorization.239 Second, several countries are
hesitant to bring captured suspects to their courts not only because of the logistical
problems-travel, evidence, witnesses, delay, and cost, among others-but also
considerations of the need to comply with strict human rights norms and the risk
that the suspect might seek asylum. Hence, freed after capture, suspects often
await the next venture, hoping for success.
240
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
An effective solution to the menace of piracy off the coast of Somalia has to
be comprehensive, focusing on peace and stability in that country. How to bring
that about and what political means and political will are needed to accomplish that
objective are beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the focus here has been on
international and regional cooperative measures to prevent and deter acts of piracy
and to bring pirates to justice. The critical elements remain (1) to find appropriate
means and authority to apprehend, detain, and prosecute suspected pirates and, (2)
to make sufficient arrangements for imprisoning them in the region, or to extradite
the suspects. In this respect, the efforts undertaken by the United Nations and
several international organizations are noteworthy. Also, although some states
have taken the necessary steps, the creation of an effective legal framework
depends upon uniform state practice in this regard.
The laudable role of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and
regional organizations in providing assistance to Kenya and Seychelles to ensure
237. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, The Pirates of the Gulf ofAden: The Coalition is the Strategy,
45 STAN. J. INT'L L. 243,254-57 (2009).
238. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 52, pmbl.
239. See James Kraska & Brian Wilson, International Coordination is the Key to Countering
Modern-Day Freebooters, ARMED FORCES J., available at http://www.armedforces
journal.corn/2009/02/3928962; see also Said, 2010 WL 3893761, at *6.
240. See Piracy Laws Under Review in Nation, MOWCA, available at www.mowca.org/
new%20design/news/newsOl35.html (last visited September 26, 2010) ("The biggest challenge we are
facing in dealing with piracy in the East African Coast is lack of proper laws that allow us to prosecute
them in our own countries .... "). Thirteen pirates arrested in Tanzanian waters were set free because
of the lack of legal grounds in Tanzania to prosecute them. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 237.
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prosecution and imprisonment of those suspected of piracy needs to be enhanced.
Consequently, burden sharing becomes an important item on the international
agenda.
States that have not yet criminalized acts of piracy in their domestic
legislation or provided the necessary authorization under the pertinent international
conventions and customary international law to prosecute and punish suspected
pirates must do so as a matter of priority. States are also under a treaty obligation
to cooperate in the repression of piracy, under UNCLOS article 100: "All States
shall cooperate to the fullest extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or
in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State. 241
Granted, these efforts cannot suffice for a comprehensive long-term solution.
In the short-term, however, they can provide the necessary deterrence to limit the
toll taken by international commerce and navigation in the last decade. As the
representative from Norway said in the discussion at the Security Council, on
August 25, 2010, "It is simply unacceptable that the suspects are released when
there is sufficient evidence against them, as this undermines the credibility and
effectiveness of the naval presence. 242
Many European countries have been doing just that, the "catch-and-release"
approach. For instance, the European Union's naval forces released 235 of the 275
pirates they captured in March and April 2010, according to a Swedish navy
commander and spokesman for the EU forces. 243  Similarly, several countries
including Russia, Portugal, Canada, and the Netherlands have routinely released
captured pirates.2 " Bringing pirates to justice is essential for its deterrent effect.
Prosecutions must be done in compliance with widely recognized principles of due
process and applicable international human rights norms.
Ideally Somalia should try and imprison its own nationals, but since it does
not have the judicial capacity for this task, alternative means have to be found.
Thus, detention, prosecution, and imprisonment have to take place in the region
where the piracy was committed because of cultural, familial, and linguistic
considerations and the proximity to where the acts took place, so that the patrolling
naval states can transfer them there. It seems appropriate that perhaps a special
chamber in one of the states in that region could specifically deal with this issue.
For this to happen extensive personnel and financial support from other countries
and organizations would be required.
241. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 100.
242. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info, supra note 77, para. 85.
243. Craig Whitlock, Lack of Prosecution Poses Challenge for Foreign Navies that Capture
Pirates, WASH. POST, May 24, 2010, at A8, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/23/AR2010052303893.html.
244. Anne Applebaum, Somali Pirate's Clash with Russian Navy Reveals a Gap in Rule of Law,
WASH. POST, May 18, 2010, at A19; Ellen Barry, Russia Frees Somali Pirates it had Seized in
Shootout, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2010, at A4; Piracy: Wrong Signals, Pirates and Legal Knots, THE
ECONOMIST, May 9, 2009; Craig Whitlock, supra note 243.
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Should the payment of ransom to pirates, which is the usual practice in
seeking freedom for hostages or the release of hostage ships and cargo, be
prohibited? The delegate from South Africa suggested this move at the Security
Council meeting of July 26, 2010.245 However, currently there does not seem to be
wide support for this approach.
At the same Security Council meeting, Ukraine said that it intended to submit
for the General Assembly's consideration a draft comprehensive convention on
24combating piracy and armed robbery at sea. 46 The prospects for such a
comprehensive convention do not appear to be promising at this stage. Currently,
the existing legal framework presents the best prospects. States must cooperate
fully with one another and with international and regional organizations to ensure
its effective implementation.
POSTSCRIPT
Incidents of piracy and armed robbery in 2010 reached 445, compared with
400 in 2009, as reported by the Piracy Reporting Center of the International
Maritime Bureau, an agency which receives reports of pirate attacks twenty-four
hours a day from around the globe and has monitored piracy worldwide since
1991. These numbers have risen every year since 2006.247 Pirates captured 1,181
seafarers in 2010, compared with 1,050 in 2009, while 188 crewmembers were
taken hostage in 2006.24 ' Ninety-two percent of all ships seized in 2010 were
hijacked off the coast of Somalia. Captain Pottengal Mukundan, Director of the
IMB's Piracy Reporting Center, said that the numbers for hostages and vessels
taken were the highest "we have ever seen." Furthermore, "[t]he continued
increase in these numbers is alarming.,
249
While the number of incidents rose in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the South
China Seas, and violent attacks continued around Nigeria, one bright spot,
according to the report, was the Gulf of Aden. In the Gulf of Aden the number of
incidents halved in 2010, with fifty-three attacks compared with 117 in 2009. The
IMB attributes the decline "to the deterrence work of naval forces from around the
world that have been patrolling the area since 2008 and to the ships' application of
self-protection measures recommended in Best Management Practices, version 3..
a booklet published last year by the shipping industry and navies. 250
Other developments included conviction of five Somali pirates on federal
piracy charges in the Virginia Federal District Court, the first piracy conviction in
245. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info, supra note 77, paras. 83-84.
246. Id. para. 88
247. Press Release, Commercial Crime Serv. of Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Hostage-Taking at
Sea Rises to Record Levels, Says IMB (Jan. 17, 2011) available at http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/429-
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the United States since 1819.251 On January 21, 2011, the South Korean Navy
rescued a tanker that had been hijacked by Somali pirates, killing eight of the
pirates, capturing five, and rescuing all twenty-one hostages. IMB Director
Mukundan commented: "The IMB commends the robust actions of the South
Korean navy and renews its call for greater naval action in the fight against this
brand of maritime crime. 252 It should be noted that during the first three weeks of
January, the IMB Piracy Reporting Center had already reported thirty-nine
incidents, thirty-one of which are attributed to Somali pirates.253
In December 2010, the One Earth Future Foundation released a report entitled
"The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy"254 , analyzing the cost in three regions:
1) the Horn of Africa; 2) Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea; and 3) the Malacca
Straits. It concludes that the global cost of piracy "is at least $7 to $12 billion per
year," which, according to the report, is using "conservative estimates, so as to not
overinflate the costs. '255 The report found that the ransoms paid to Somali pirates
have increased from an average of $150,000 in 2005 to $5.4 million in 2010.216 A
South Korean oil tanker, the Samho Dream, paid the highest ransom on record,
$9.5 million to Somali pirates in November 2010; approximately $23 8 million was
paid in ransoms to Somali pirates in 2010 alone.257 Pirates held ships for an
average of 106 days between April and June 2010, up from fifty-five days in 2009
and the last four ships released in November 2010 were held for an average of 150
days.258
The judiciary in Kenya has tried pirates captured outside of Kenyan territorial
waters because of a series of agreements with the United States, the European
Union, and other countries. However, in November 2010 a senior Kenyan judge
said that the courts in Kenya have to power to prosecute crimes that took place
outside Kenya's territorial waters.259
Because most countries capturing pirates usually set them free after a period
of time, with a few exceptions, such as the trial in Virginia, there seems to be a
need for an effective punishment and deterrent system. One obvious possibility
251. Assoc. Press, 5 Somalis are Found Guilty of Attacking U.S. Warship, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
2010, at A26; Warren Richey, Five Somali Pirates Convicted of Attacking US Navy Ship, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 24, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/1124/Five-Somali-pirates-
convicted-of-attacking-US-Navy-ship.
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Rescues Hijacked Ship (Jan. 21, 2011) http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/430-southkoreannavyrescues
hijackedship.
253. Id.
254. Anna Bowden, The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy (One Earth Future Foundation
Working Paper, Dec. 2010)
255. .Id. at 25.
256. Id. at 9.
257. Id. at 9-10.
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that should be explored is a tribunal to try pirates, under an international
framework. The Security Council's Chapter VII may provide the United Nations
the authority to establish such a international tribunal. The challenges of
establishing such an international judicial body are enormous, but seriously
considering this possibility remains worthwhile.260
260. See, e.g, David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, A Better Way to Deal With Pirates,
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2010, at A27 available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/12/08/AR2010120806188.html (suggesting that the Security Council create such a
tribunal and that the United states pay a leading role).
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